Ly William Dudgeon 1493. i. 10.

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THE

# STATE

# Moral Waorld

CONSIDER'D, &c.



Price Six-pence.

Minusia Me CONSIDER'D Price Six-pence.

### STATE

OF THE

## Mozal Wazeld

CONSIDER'D;

Or, 2 Vindication of PROVIDENCE in the Government of the MORAL WORLD;

SHEWING

That there is no other Evil in it, but that arising from the necessary Impersection of Creatures. And that this Life is a State of Discipline, to train us up in Virtue, by which we are fitted for a more persect Society, capable of greater Happiness in a future State of Existence.

#### By W. D.

This Infancy of Being cannot prove
The final Issue of the Works of God,
By Love and Wisdom unexpressive form'd,
And ever rising with the rising Mind!
Thomson's Summer.

EDINBURGH:

Printed by R. FLEMING and Company, and fold by Mr. James M'EUEN, and other Book-felless in Town. MDCCXXXII.



CONSIDER'D;

Or, a Vindication of Inovidence in the Covenances of the Monage Works Works

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Amen's Council

E.D. I.N. B. G. H:
Righted by R. Francisco and Communicated feld by
Mr. James Mr. Mr. ard einer Mookfelfeld

T. Tawa Mr. Mr. Cannal



#### THE

#### PREFACE.

HE Subject of the following Dialogue will not, I hope, be unacceptable to the Publick, the Design of it being to assert the universal Goodness of Good in the Government of the World, by making all Creatures to be proportionably more or less happy as they prastise Virtue, which tendeth to the Good of the whole as well as to the Good of every Individual: And that Virtue is the Perfection and Happiness of all Men, and Vice their Misery by natural necessary Consequence; which demonstrateth that it is absolutely impossible for the vicious to commute the Matter any Way what soever, so as to expect to be as happy as the virtuous, but by living the Life of the virtuous.

If this small Attempt to vindicate Providence in the Government of the World from the mistaken Opinions of some concerning it, be favourably received; it may, perhaps, encourage some of greater Leisure and Abilities to enlarge further upon it. In the mean Time, if any think that I am in the Wrong, I do assure them that it is not thro Design; so that if they will be pleased to show me my Error, I will receive their Instruction with Pleasure and Acknow-

ledgment.



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#### Moral World confider'd.

SECT. I.



Eeing, my Friend, we are fo conveniently met, when we have Time, and are not like to be interrupted in this retired Place, I would, if you

please, enter upon a Subject that is attended with Difficulties, which I would fain have clear'd, viz. The Origin of Moral-Evil in the Government of a perfectly good Being?

B. You could not have proposed a Subject more worthy of our Consideration, in such a convenient Time and Place; but this

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contient Question hath been so well handled before, that, I think, little more can be said to solve it; yet I say, it will be well spent Time to go over what hath been already said by others, so we may be fix'd on a Subject of such Importance. For me, indeed, I never doubt that whatever particular Ills may be, yet there is no Evil in the whole of the Government of a perfectly good Being ‡.

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A. That nothing is Evil in the Whole, and yet some Ill in the Particulars, which make up that Whole, flicks mightily with That there necessarily exists a Cause of all Things, the Things themselves demonstrate, and that he is a Being of infinite Goodness, Wisdom and Power, hath, you know, been gone about to be demonstrated, by fome with admirable Success, after this Manner. They have gone thro' the principal Phanomena of Nature, and shown, That what hath been thought Ill by some, is only Imperfection, which can't properly be called Evil, seeing all created Things are necessarily liable to it; nay further, that every Particular, which we have the Means of knowing the Circumstances of, is demonfiratively

<sup>†</sup> This wou'd be a commendable Government in one whose Wildom and Power is not Perfect, but there is no Paralel between Perfection and Imperfection.

firatively made the most useful and service able, that the Nature of the Thing is capable of: And that we ought by Parity of Reason to conclude the same of those Things, which we have not had Opportunity or Means of coming to so thorough a Knowledge of, it being only the want of such a perfect. Knowledge of Things, that hindereth us from seeing that all Things are perfectly good in their Kind, as design'd and made by a Being of perfect Goodnels, with infinite Wisdom to contrive, and infinite Power to execute his good Intentions. This they have done with respect to the natural World, to the full Conviction of all who attend to it. I will they had attain'd the like Success, with respect to the Moral World.

B. If I am not mistaken they have, by shewing, That there is no other Evil in the Moral World, but what necessarily ariseth from the Abuse of that noble Faculty. Liberty, with which rational Agents are

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A. I am to fully convinc'd by the Works of Nature, and by the Beauty and Strength of the Arguments a Priori, that there exists a Being of all Perfections; who, as he is infinitely happy of himself, could have no other End in creating all Variety of subcredinate Beings, but to communicate to each of them, all the Happiness their several Na-

tures

tures are capable of; making the inanimate for the Use of the animate, and they for the mutual Service of one another, all confpiring to the Good of the Whole. I am so fully convinc'd of This, I say, that I cannot agree with them in saying, "That by the "Abuse of the Faculty Liberty, with which rational Creatures are endued, they have introduced Moral Evil, i. e. Sin and Wickedness into the World, contrary to God's Intention, and by this subverted the Order and Harmony established in the Creation". Is not this a Contradiction to infinite Wisdom and Power, who could not fail to contrive and execute the Means of a

good Intention?

But by the Way, I think that this Character of the Deity, viz. That all his other infinite Perfections are subservient to the Purposes of Goodness, will not be disputed. Seeing if we suppose it otherwise, that he is a Being of infinite Wisdom and Power, not govern'd by perfect Goodness, but acting by meer Will and Caprice, or perhaps Malice, then he is the just Object of the greatest Fear and Hatred. Again, if he is a good Being, without infinite Wisdom, or without infinite Power, he is so tar Imperfect, tho' he is the Object of Love, nay, he is the Object of Pity too. Such Characters of the One true general Cause are as absurd,

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The Attributes of the Deity are the different Modifications of his All-perfect Mind. His Knowledge or Wisdom is intuitive, as some of ours is, but mostly our Knowledge is attain'd by Reasoning, i. e. by comparing the Ideas he excites in us, and drawing Inferences from them. Justice and Mercy can't strictly be called distinct Attributes, but different Acts of Wisdom exerted in Punishment or Forgiveness, as they tend most to the Good of the Subjects on which they are exercised.

B. All that I readily grant, and it is to be regreted that the Justice of God hath been so misrepresented, by some in their Systems, as to be in the strictest Sense a Principle of

Cruelty. But to return,

If this Liberty is a possible Thing of itself, and given to Creatures for good Purpoles, even for the Beauty and Perfection of the whole Creation, and as you allow it necessary to the Beauty and Order of the whole, and consistent with the universal Wisdom and Goodness of the Creator, that there should be different and various Degrees of Creatures, whereof consequently some must be less perfect than others, and this Liberty implying a natural Power of doing Evil as well as good, and the imperfect Nature of finite.

abuse this their Liberty to the actual Commission of Evil; hence there necessarily arrifeth a Possibility of Evil, notwithstanding

that the Creator is infinitely good.

A. This Evil then is no other but what necessarily ariseth from the Impersection of Creatures, and is Impersection, which can't properly be called Evil or Sin, being insepatable in some Degree, from all created Beings, and most consistent with the Designs of a persect Creator.

B. But let us consider what this Liberty is, and how the Abuse of it is the Occasion of Sin, for which we say rational and

free Agents are accountable.

A. With all my Heart; for that will determine whether Men act, or not, contra-

ry to God's Intention?

B Liberty is defin'd to be a Power of beginning Motion, or a Self-motive Faculty, or a Power of acting, which Faculty or I ower is exerted treely upon the last Judgment of the Understanding: Now, tho' the Will is necessarily determin'd by the last Judgment of the Understanding, this is only in a moral Sense, the motive Power being still free to all, because the last Judgment of the Understanding is no physical Efficient, but only a moral Motive.

Men

Men being thus naturally free, shou'd determine themselves to act according to the eternal Law of Reason, which God himself (being perfectly free) determineth all his Actions by, and as it is a perfect Rule to the most perfect Being, it is certainly a perfect Rule to his imperfect Creatures, who being made free, and with Faculties to discover, this Law, Almighty God requireth, that they should att according to it. But they, by Virtue of this Freedom, without which they wou'd be meer Machines, incapable of Virtue and Happinels, act contrary to this eternal Law of Reason, and thus introduce Vice and Wickedness, for which they'll be called to Account.

A. That Men are not necessary Agents in a natural Sense, is certain, a necessary Agent being no Agent at all, but a Patient, and the eternal Law of Reason or Nature, which God requireth rational Creatures to act by, being the same with the Practice of Virtue, which tends to make them happy; (because it is inconsistent with the Goodness of God, who made them to be happy, to require any Thing of them but what tendeth to their Happiness) so it is own'd by all, by experiencing it true in Fact, that every one acteth by the Appearance of Good (the Desire of Good or Happiness)

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ness being an innate, inseparable Principle from all Creatures.) But being imperfect Creatures, i. e. limited in their Power and Faculties, 'tis impossible, but that in some Cases they should not discover what is their real Good or Happiness, and so fall into Vice, by mistaking their true Happiness, and doing that which brings some Degree of Mifery upon them; and this Punishment, the natural Consequence of Vice, will be for their after Good, by teaching them how to act in the like Cases; thus every new Experience will teach them to purfue their Happiness more fleadily. In all this there will be found no other Evil, but that of necessary Imperfection in Creatures, still improving by Discipline; which is most confistent with the perfect Goodness of the Creator, with every Thing's being perfect ly good in its Kind, and with every Thing's coming to pays according to the Divine Fore-knowledge and Decree, which cuts off all Accountableness and positive Punishment.

B. You seem to make a moral Necessity come to the fame in Effect, with a natural Necessity; but the' I own it certainly true, that the Will is necessarily determin'd by the last Jadgment of the Understanding, or that Motive, which after more or less Consideration, seems to be most for our Good, yet the self Motive Faculty exerteth it self freely;

Action of moral Agents comes to pass by a moral Necessity, as unerringly as any Effect in Nature, according to the Divine Decrees, else there could be no Foundation for Pra-

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A. The Difference between the Exertion of the Self-motive Faculty, and the Will's moving the Body to Action, I do not understand, and that any Thing should move Body or Matter, an inert Thing, but the Will or Mind is impossible; and farther the Mind cannot move the Body to Action, Without an Inclination or Disposition to move to one Action rather than another, as she is determined by the greatest Motive, or that Motive which seems to carry the most Good with it. Whether Prescience can be built on any Thing besides this moral Necessity, I leave you to explain?

B. The Certainty of Fore-knowledge does not cause the Certainty of Things, but is it self founded on the Reality of their

Existence.

A. The same may be faid of Knowledge,

without being much to the Purpole.

B. More particularly the Foundation of Practionce I take to be this. As one Man who knows another's Disposition, can before Hand tell what he will do in certain Circumstances; and a wifer Man fill with greater

greater Certainty can foretell that. So the Deity perfectly knows every one's Tempers and Inclinations of their Minds, the Dispositions and Affections of their Bodies, and all other external Circumstances they shall be in; and farther can tell, what Motives will be presented to them, and how they shall be determin'd by them; all which put together, becomes infinitely exact, and is the Foundation of Prascience, without being

the Cause of Action.

A. This feems to come just to what I have faid; but tho' the Paralel upon your, Supposition holds between the wife Man's and the Deity's Manner of foretelling future Events, yet the one is not the Cause of the Action which the other is. The Creature does not, you know, give it felf any Faculties or Inclinations, but all is given to it by the Creator, (who, as he is perfectly good, could not give any ill ones) and besides his creating all with certain Inclinations or Dispositions, he orders all their external Circumstances what soever as he sees best, and fo can't but know what Motives will be presented to them, and how they will be determin'd by them, and thus what shall come to pass, which can be no other than what he of his infinite Goodness design'd, and consequently not Evil or Wicked, tho' the Actions of some Creatures may be faid to be Evil

Evil or Imperfect in respect of the Actions of others, arriv'd to a greater Degree of Knowledge and Perfection.

B. This feems to lead to absolute Fate, every one acting what he could not but do,

which takes away all Choice?

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A. There is no doubt but that every one does what he fees to be best in every Cafe, and so could not do otherwise; to suppose one could chuse to act otherwise than what he thought best in every Case, is an absord Thing . If People were necessitated to act otherwife than as they thought best, this would be a fad Fate indeed! But to chuse to act upon the best Reason we can discover, is a Freedom and Perfection truly valuable. To fay we are free from this moral Necessity, to chuse among indifferent Things, or to chuse one or more Things among many others exactly alike, is Triffling; because the Things being perfectly indifferent,

<sup>\*</sup> I mean at the present Time, for he may think, after having got more Knowledge, that it would have been better for him to have acted otherwise. But still my Meaning may be mistaken here, by some who lay a great Stress upon our natural Power of acting, or being free from any external natural Force, to do as we will, as if I denied this. But I do affirm, that every one is conscious that he hath a natural Liberty to act as he wills. But then we are also Conscious, that we cannot Will otherwise in any one Case, but as we are determined by the prevailing Motive, or that Motive which we at present think will be most for our Good.

which to take: In common Affairs, we say, there is no Choice among such Things, I

will take the next to my Hand.

B. To settle what you advance more fully, the Desires, Powers, Faculties, Ge, of Creatures, should be enquired into, that it may appear, whether some do not abuse them, and so introduce Evil and Vice of another Sort than what can be called Imperfection; but let us rest a little.

#### SECT. II.

B T TAving reflected upon what we was left discoursing, I find that this Self-motive or active Pomer is no other than the Soul, Mind or Will herfelf determining the Body, which is only a palfive Instrument to Action, and that this Mind or Will cannot be forced in a natural Sense, yet if the was not excited by some Inclination or Affection (which is in general the Defire of Good or Happiness) to Action, the would not all at all, being perfectly indifferent to all Action; and the Defire of Happiness being her inseparable Principle, the will always be necestarily determined (in a moral Sense, which can only be applied to the Will) to act by the prepollent Motive, or that which

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which feems to carry the greater Good with it. Thus every Creature, of a higher or lower Degree, necessarily pursueth their Go'd as God hath design'd, who also giveth the Means of attaining that Happiness, which are their feveral Powers and Faculties; but as these in all Creatures are more or less imperfect, and the Knowledge how to apply them being best learn'd by Experience, it cannot be otherwise than that all Creatures should sometime be mistaken in the Pursuit of their Good; yet this Mistake of Happiness being some Degree of Misery, makes them wifer, so that they will pursue it more steadily after. This is the most effectual Way of Teaching, one not being so well convinc'd what is his Happiness, or what his Misery, as when he finds it by Experience. But we are next to examine what those Powers and Faculties, Affections and Inclina-tions of the Mind of Man are, so that we may know that none of them are ill as some imagine, or at least, we may see if every one keeps the Ballance among them, and governs them by the chief Principle of Rea-Son, so as not to apply them to evil Purpofes? In the mean Time, I think, that npon this Scheme there is no other Difference between Virtue and Vice than that between Perfection and Imperfection. A. And

A. And that is so great a Difference as will not fail to make all who understand it. love and pursue the one, and for sake the other as much as is in their Power. But to go on to what you desir'd, which I shall do in general, a particular System on the Passions not being what you expect from me. And this I am the more willing to do, that as there is no Evil in the natural World, but what necessarily arises from Matter and Motion, and the imperfed Nature of all created Things, which yet are the best that can be made; fo I say, it may be made further to appear that there is no Evil in the moral World, but what necessarily ariseth from the Nature of imperfect Creatures, who always purfue their Good, but cannot but be liable to Error or Mistake. But as all this Evil is only that of Imperfection, which is inseparable from all created Things whatfoever, it cannot properly be called evil, wicked, or contrary to God's Intention, but perfectly confistent with his good Designs which he could not fail to execute.

The Desires, Affections or Passions of the Mind are divided, in the general, into Selfish and Publick. The selfish or private Passions are such, as Love of Life and its Conveniences, Love of Honour, Resentment of Injuries, Desire of Sensual Pleasures, or Appetite

petite towards Nourishment and the Means

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The publick Passions are such as the Desire of universal Good or publick Happiness, Friendship, Complacency, Compassion,
Love of Offspring and Relations. The private Desires are called interested as they
are planted in us chiefly for our private
Good. And the publick Desires are called
disinterested or benevolent as they are planted in us for the Good of others, so that considering the private and publick Desires as
two natural Desires or Dispositions in us,
we cannot be happy, but in pursuing the
Satisfaction or Ends of both those Desires
consistently with one another.

And this is the Foundation for benevolent Actions; the End which the publick Defires directly excite to, is the Good of others, which by Experience we find to be our greatest Good, which sheweth the unexpressible Love and Goodness of the wise Author of our Nature, in thus strictly joining the Interests of Mankind: So that the generous Part who do Good to others out of pure Love and Affection, come by this, to enjoy the greatest Pleasure and Happiness to themselves, and even the felsish Part cannot be happy, but by promoting the Good of

their Neighbours.

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Every one is conscious that he hath such Affections and Passions, and that by their being duly ballanced and exercised on their proper Objects he hath Pleasure, and on the contrary, Pain; it follows that none of them are ill of themselves, but given for good Purpoles, and that whatever is thought to be ill among them, ariseth from their not being duly ballanced, or properly applied, which, you would fay, should be the Businels of the superior Faculty, Reason, which shall be considered, after observing that a virtuous Life is defin'd (in a large Sense) to be such a Course of Action as sheweth, that both the Ends of the private and publick Defires are confistently pursued, which promoteth, of Consequence, both the greatest private and publick Good; and on the contrary, fo far as this is not advanced, thro' fome of the Ends which the Desires excite to being purfued, and others negletted, fuch a Life is reckoned to be fo far vicious. But more strictly, those Actions which flow from the publick Defires, are only reckon'd virtuous; and those Actions which flow from the private Desires, while the publick ones are negletted, are accounted vicious.

All the Desires then being good, or given for good Purposes, Evil ariseth only from the Abuse of them, as may be instanced in one which some have reckoned ill, viz.

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Resentment. This Passion is of great Use to us in hindering both present and future Injuries, from these who may so far mistake their Happiness, as to pursue it in Opposition to ours. By our Refentment they will be taught that it doth not ly there; and when this Resentment goes so far with us, as to turn to direct Hatred and Revenge, this arifeth from a mistaken or wrong Opinion, that those who injured us, by thinking their Happiness would be promoted in so doing, did it thro' direct Malice and Design. This sheweth us how much our Happiness confisteth in having true Opinions of Men and Things, and the Tendency of Actions, that we may purfue the Satisfaction of our Defires aright, by which is meant the governing of the Defires; and in doing this is the great Use of Realon, which we attain thus. When we begin to live in the World, we are governed by others till we come to the Use of our Reason, which we do by Degrees; thus, by experiencing what Desires, when satisfied, give us the greatest Pleasure or Happiness, and by observing by what Course of Action we obtain'd fuch Satisfaction, and fo comparing one Cale with another which we know, we reason upon what will be the best for us to do in other Cases. In a Word, the Use of Reason in governing and ballancing the Defires is this. The Defires are the Springs

Springs exciting to Action, our Happiness which is involved in that of the Publick, is the End, and Reason discovers or points out the best Means to that End. But the Defires, and the Faculty of Reason or Power to apprehend, judge and infer, being fo far weak and imperfect in all Creatures; hence arifeth errong Opinions, and that Imperfection of Action or Vice, in some Degree in all Creatures, as they are made more or less perfect, confistently with that Display of the univerfal Goodness of the Creator, in creating all Orders of subordinate Beings, who by Experience and Discipline will be going on while they exist (and it seems altogether inconfistent with the Perfections of the Creator, to annihilate his Works) to attain more and more Knowledge, to purfue that Happiness defign'd them.

B. I perceive, by what hath been faid, that it may be made out by Instances, that there is no evil Desire or Affection in Nature (and if it were so, it would not only prove the Creature ill, but the Creator himfelf who gave them) but that all which is called Vice in Action, there being none in Intention, ariseth from the Desires being weak and impersect, and the Knowledge or Wisdom got by comparing and drawing Interences from the Ideas which we have from Sensation and Reslection on what passes

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ses within our Minds, i. e. our Knowledge got by Reasoning, which teacheth us how to pursue the Ends of our Desires, being alfo weak and imperfect; from this necessary Imperfection of Creatures, I fee that all the Irregularities in the moral World may be accounted for; which Irregularities or Evils, tho' arising from the necessary Imperfection of Creatures, yet to unwary Observers feem to flow from evil Intentions or Dispositions. But to go through with this, would take in fuch a Compass of Time and Particulars, that no Man is Sufficient for it. After all, I think by this View of Things, one of the principal Arguments for a future State is entirely cut off, viz. that brought from the perverted Order of Things here, Vice often flourishing, and Virtue falling into Distress, which infers a future State in which all Things will be fet to Rights, by punishing Vice and rewarding Virtue.

A. Was it true that the Order of Things is perverted here, this Argument drawn from it in Proof of a future State, in which all Things are to be fet to Rights, proveth rather the contrary. For if Things are wrong in this State, it is a sprewd Presumption, that they will be always so, else they must say that he is another Sort of Governor who ruleth in the next State, than he who governeth in this: Harmony, Order and

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and Design must be begun here, else we can never expect that they will be improving in the other World. So that upon this Scheme where every Thing is as good as can be, there being no other Diforder, Vice or Misery, but what necessarily ariseth from the finite and imperfect Nature of Creatures in this their State of Infancy, who are still improving by Experience and Discipline, and attaining greater and greater Degrees of Perfection, Virtue and Happiness, which of Course fits them for a more perfect Society; Upon this Scheme, I say, a future State can only be built. This added to the natural Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality and Immortality, and to that brought from the Inconfistency with the infinite Power, Wifdom and Goodness of the Creator, who made Creatures to be happy, to annihilate them, and fo deprive them of it, will amount to the compleatest Demonstration possible, except immediate Possession. More of this after. What is brought by Materialifts arguing from the Powers of Matter against the Immateriality of the Mind or Soul, is fo ridiculous, that when they come to examine ever fo frielly into Matter, they know nothing of it, unless it be a mere pasfive inert Thing without any Powers at all. But to enquire a little into the present State and the Diforders of it. rozeweth in th

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### And it would be as reasonable in then? to grantly their Laffer, T.D. Ht. grantly their Laffer, T.D. Ht.

If this were a possible Case, whoever of the A man O begin with examining what is meant by Vice flourishing, and Victue falling into Diffrest; Vice in Actions (there being none in Intention, all Defires exciting either to private or publick Good) being the falling thort of our greatest Goody either by the Strength of some private Defire, or the Weakness of our Reason to direct us in purfuing the Gratification of our publick Defires. This will nevertail to bring a proportionable Digree of Misery upon us. And Virtue being the confisent Gratification of all our private and publick Defires, cannot fail to make us bappy. So that in this Senfer Virtue flourisheth, and Vice brings Pain and Diffress. If we could suppose Creatures with Defirer contrary ours, to as their Hapa piness consisted in croffing ours; Them, as we have a Power of perceiving and approving Virtue, and disapproving Vice, which is by fome nam'd a moral Sense, fo we have also a publick Sense, by which we are pleased or displeased with publickly useful or hurtful Actions; Them, I say, we would condemn' as vicious and wicked, the with Respect to themselves, the Gratification of their Defires would be good, and approved by their Neighbours of the like Senfes and Defires! And

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And it would be as reasonable in them to gratify their Desires, as in us to gratify ours. If this were a possible Case, whoever of the two Sets of Beings were more perfect in their Kind, and became happy at the others Cost, those last would say, that Vice stourished, and Virtue fell into Distress. But no such contradictory Case can happen in the Government of a perfectly wise and good Being.

Vice's flourishing and Virtue's falling into Diffress then, must be understood with Refeet to external Circumstances. To know the Truth concerning this, I leave you to dast your Eye abroad into the World and make your Observations, and perhaps you may find that the Riches and Power are of great Use even in procuring the Means of gratifying of many of our Defires both publick and private, yet these are not the most happy who peffels most of them, or they the most unhappy who have not so large a Portion of them: But that probably all external Circumstances are so ordered by the Deity, with Respect to every one as is most conducice to keep their Defires in the best Ballance, and to strengthen the Publick ones. which are like to be of the greatest Use to advance our Happiness, both in This and a future State of Existence.

B. There seems to be much Truth in this. But it being endless to go thro Par-

ticulars, I will give you my Opinion in some principal Cajes. We often observe the Rich and Powerful (who are the most capable by those Means to do the greatest Good, in which consisteth the greatest Pleasure a rational Creature can enjoy) very uneafy; because they apply them for the Gratification of lower Defires, as those called the Pleasures of the internal Senses, such as delight in Musick, Houles, Gardens, Dress, Equipage; or in Hunting, Feafting and other Pleasures of the external Senses, which tho' good in their own Place, and have a certain Degree of Pleasure attending them, yet cannot be compar'd to the Pleasures of the Moral and publick Senses, either for Intenseness or Duration, nothing yielding fo noble, rational, exquisite and latting Pleasures, as the Reflection on our Virtue, and our being the Instruments of advancing the Happiness of all those whom our Influence can extend to. And on the contrary, we see Men in low Condition, who mind nothing besides taking Care of their Families, and maintaining them by their daily Labour, and in being, in one Word, good Neighbours: We fee those, I fay, for the most part very happy; because they, not having the Means, never think of pursuing the Pleasures of the Great, which are very precarious and of short Duration. But the general Constitution of the Moral World

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World with respect to such Things, I take

The Defires, Powers and Faculties of all Creatures being Good, and more perfect in the higher Orders of Creatures, I think it will be own'd, that those of the Creatures of the same Rank and Order are pretty equal; and as to the Differences that may appear in advanc'd Age, they are in great Measure owing to external Circumstances, as the natural Constitution of their bodily Organs, Education, &c. Those again are adapted to their several Stations of Life, certain Qualifications being requisite for Magistrates, Teachers, &c. which are not requisite for Husbandmen, Merchants and Mechanicks, &c. econtra.

Again, Riches and Power are given to those, who, the Deity knoweth, will make the best Use of them, or not abuse them, so much as those would do who have not got so much. On the other Hand, those who have not so great Riches and Power, can all their part better with what they have, than those who have more could have done in their Circumstances. And it is worth observing, that those who employ what Talents they have given them, tho' sewer or weaker, to the best Advantage that they can, are as virtuous or perfect in Proportion, as those who have the most and greatest Talents, and

and employ them the best, which maketh all the Vertuous content, easy or happy, being pleased with having done all in their Power. And now having viewed and considered the State of the Moral World with respect to the Intentions and Astrons of Creatives and their external Circumstances, I must acknowledge to you, that there is he Evil but Impersection in it. Yet you have a great many Authorities against you in this Opinion. Many crying, That where is not one who doth Good, but all are wicked!

A Such Declaimers always except themfelves and a few of their Elect Party, who, they own too, have their Failings of Infirmities; which shows us, that what Imperfections those find in themselves, they thro' wrong Opinion, take to be wicked Prin ciples of Inventions in all others. But tho fuch imperfect Creatures as Men are be liable to many Mistakes or Errors, in purito ing their Happiness, which is involved in that of the Publick; yet if it was well confidered, there will not be fo much Error this Way found in the World, as fome imagine. Many, thro' mistake, pronouncing others, for the Neglect of fome indifferent Actions, which they believe that God will positively reward 'em for the Performance of to be in damnable Errors. Virtue" Virtue then being the Perfection and Happiness of all rational Creatures, which all covet and pursue; and Vice their Misery, which none love or will continue in, when they shall find or be inform'd how to be more happy; consequently, one Man cannot be more serviceable to another, than to present to him such Motives and Arguments as will convince him that such a Course of Action (which are all those Actions that promote universal Good) will make him happy, which shortneth his Way to it. Nor, can one do a greater Injury to another, than to lead him wrong, the both may be done with the same good Intention.

B. The Mistakes of some often affect others, and make them so far positively unhappy, such as Perfecution, Oppression and the like; what shall we say of those Cases? can we suppose these will be for the Good

of the Sufferers?

A. The first of these may proceed from Love to others, some thinking that to be of such and such Opinions can only recommend them to the Deity; and when they cannot perswade them to be of such Opinions by Arguments, they would force them to it, which is impossible. But more frequently it proceedeth from the Wickedness of their Reason, as doth always Oppression, each Parties thinking to advance their Happiness

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piness by taking from their Neighbours, elther by Fraud or Violence, what they poflefs. But if their Neighbours, the perfecuted or oppressed, get Power, they will Resent it, as others will also do, who are not so nearly concerned, nay, the Sense of Mankind torns against them, which is also a Punishment to those who love Honour and Esteem. By all this Persecutors and Oppreffors will be taught and punish'd for their Errors; besides when they shall come to the Knowledge of their Error, which they will certainly do sooner or later, in this or another State, it will be Matter of uneafy Reflection or Remorfe to them, for occasioning fo much Misery to others. And further, many of the selfish Defires being probably ufeful only in this State, the strengthning those, and neglecting to cultivate the Publick ones, will cast them far behind others in Perfection and Happiness in the next State.

For those and many other Errors of some, affecting others, they may be design'd by God for their Good, even for strengthning their Virtue, and shewing them more effectually, the Evil attending Vice, which is the Way to hinder them from falling into the like Errors, and that they may teach their Neighbours, the Persecutors, Oppressions, &c. the same by Arguments, or it that will

will not do, to relift them, and releas the Injuries done themselves (which the Law of Self-preservation, as well as the Good of our Neighbours oblige us to do) so as make these experimentally know, that they can never advance their Happiness by injuring their Neighbours. And even while they do not meet with this, the very Thoughts of being liable to it makes them unbappy.

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B. This State then, cannot be called a State of Trial, seeing the Deity certainly knows what all his Creatures will do, they doing no other Thing than what he designed.

they should do?

A. I have called it a State of Discipline to train us up in Virtue, which you fee it is. For as we know that God who is perfeely bappy of bimfelf, could have go other exciting Reason to create us but his own infinite Goodness to make us happy it is impossible that it could be otherwise, but that when we were created innocent and naked or without Knowledge of what touded to our Happiness, and what not, we should be fent here in our imperfect State to improce. And as it is inconfident with the Goodness of God, who made us to be bappy with his Wildow, who could contrive the Means to it, and with his Power to execute them, to annihilate us, and to deprive us of it; we may certainly conclude, that he will take Nive

take us to another State, when we are fit to act our Part there, where we will be still improving, those who are farthest advanc'd here in Virtue and Knowledge, being capable of the greatest Harpiness in the next State, which is a strong Motive to excite us all to the Practice of Virtue in this Life.

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B. Every one must think that short Argnment Conclusive for the being of a future State, except those who are so weak as hardly to be argued with. I mean those who think the Deity to be an imperfect or arbitrary Being, i, e. one who afteth by meer Will and Caprice, inconfistently with any of his Perfections. Or those who think Annihilation a less Evil than Being, which none do, but they who believe that God is Cruel, and will make their Being a Curfe to them, by making their Mifery exceed their Happiness. But what should we think will be the Condition of Children who are removed from this State fo foon, that they are nothing improv'd, nor even upon the other Scheme, capable of a Trial?

A. We are so far from knowing every Thing here (the Wisest may be said to know but little of what may be known) that probable Conjecture is a sufficient Answer to many Questions. Such Children perhaps, for any Thing we know to the contrary, may be fent again, in sounder Bodies, into

the World to improve. But suppose they do not, as they had no Opportunity to improve in the social Virtues, so they have not strengthned the selfish Desires in Opposition to them, and as their being so soon removed, is thus no positive Disadvantage to themselves, and may serve some good End towards their Parents or others; so the Constitution of the other State (as that of this doth) may require a Subordination of Beings, which of it self seems necessary to

afford Matter of Action, and so of Happiness in every Society.

But as what I have advanced, viz. That every particular Thing which we know in the Moral World (as well as in the Natural World, which is adapted to the Moral World) is the best that can be made, to make up the best Whole, according to the Design of the most perfect Being. As we find this, I say, true in Fact, as far as our knowledge reacheth; fo we have all the Reafon that can be to conclude, that as we improve in the Knowledge of Things, both in this State or in others, which God of his infinite Wildom and Goodness may have defign'd to place us in, we will still be more and more charm'd and fatisfied with this excellent Truth.

